Russian nuclear strategy resembles that of other states who have sought to compensate for conventional shortcomings with nuclear tools. Russia is not a unique nuclear actor who, unlike all other nuclear states, perceives of nuclear weapons as uniquely suited for pursuing revisionist ambitions. This paper offers a Conventional Balance of Forces thesis of nuclear strategy, to explain how perceived conventional vulnerabilities and evolving conventional response options have affected Russian nuclear strategy over time. Footnote 1 But this thesis does not address whether or why states would seek to overcome nuclear dependency by improving conventional capabilities, nor how improved conventional capabilities impact nuclear strategy. The most prominent thesis has been that conventional inferiority produces increased reliance on nuclear threats. Theories about the relationship between conventional forces and nuclear strategy outcomes remain scant. As Russia has improved its conventional capabilities, its reliance response options to conventional regional threats have receded.ĭespite this close link between conventional and nuclear strategy, the nuclear strategy literature tends to focus on nuclear posturing, and particularly on nuclear capabilities, without considering the other military and non-military capabilities states use to enhance their security. But the nature of the Russian first use threat has changed over time. Russia has in the entire post-Cold War period explicitly threatened nuclear first use in response to large-scale conventional aggression. Russia, the largest nuclear weapons state in the world, perceives US conventional capabilities as a potential security threat that could jeopardize its very existence. For Russia and other potential military adversaries, it is US conventional superiority, rather than its nuclear preponderance, that produces the most severe security dilemma.
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